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LEGAL ABSTRACTS AND NOTES
formal papers, and of discussion panels dealing
with specific problems relating to questioned doc-
uments. (OH).
New Products
The Photo-Microscope-Carl Zeiss, Oberkochen,
Wiirtt. A microscope with built-in automatic
camera has a great appeal to the forensic field.
Here is such an instrument. All of the usual
methods of examination can be used, bright and
dark field and phase may be employed as well as
epi-illumination. The automatic camera is an
integral part of the microscope. Black and white
or color photographs may be taken. (JDN).
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Francis A. Heroux*
Federal Exclusionary Rule Extended-The de-
fendant was charged with housebreaking and
larceny in the District of Columbia. However, the
only evidence in support of this charge was
money seized through an unreasonable search by
the Maryland State Police. The Federal District
Court did not exclude this evidence from the de-
fendant's trial because there had been no federal
officers involved in the illegal search. The defendant
appealed on the ground that this evidence should
have been suppressed. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed
the lower court's verdict and suppressed the evi-
dence, holding that all evidence obtained by an
unconstitutional search and seizure (whether by
federal or state officers) is unacceptable in the
federal courts. Hanna v. United States (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
At the outset of its opinion, the court realized
that this was an open question, at least in the
Supreme Court. The main repositories of law on
this issue are Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914) and TWolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
The Weeks case held that an illegal search by
federal officers was a violation of the fourth
amendment and that any evidence thus procured
was inadmissible in a federal court. The Wolf case
held that an unreasonable search and seizure by a
state officer violates the Constitution because the
prohibition of the fourth amendment is included
within the fourteenth amendment. Combining
these two decisions, the court in the instant case
reached the result of excluding in a federal court
the evidence which state officers illegally seized.
*Senior Law Student, Northwestern University
School of Law.
The exclusionary rule of the federal courts is based
on the policy considerations of the integrity of
the judiciary and the fourth amendment which
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.
Thus, there is no reason why these considerations
are not equally applicable to the now unconstitu-
tional seizures by state officers.
Confession Obtained After Indictment is Ad-
missible Evidence-Following the investigation of
a murder, the defendant was indicted and a bench
warrant was issued for his arrest. On the following
night, the defendant gave himself up to the police,
and he was then questioned through the night
until he confessed. At his trial, the defendant was
convicted of this murder, and he appealed on the
ground that his confession was inadmissible as
evidence. The Court of Appeals of New York held
that, if the confession was not coerced, it was ad-
missible as evidence even if it was made during a
period of detention in violation of the law. Three
judges dissented. People v. Spano, 150 N.E.2d
226 (N. Y. 1958).
After establishing that the confession was not
coerced, the majority opinion reiterates the settled
New York law that a confession, if in fact volun-
tory, may be admissible in evidence even though
it was taken from a prisoner during an illegal de-
tention. By applying this rule, the court had no
difficulty in allowing the use of the confession.
The dissenters, while agreeing with the general
rule of law espoused by the majority, take issue
with the application of this rule to the instant
case. They accuse the majority of going outside
the permissible bounds of the rule because they
have applied it to a confession extracted during
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the very course of judicial proceedings (after in-
dictment and surrender on a bench warrant). In
doing this, the court has denied a defendant the
right to have the effective services of counsel at
every stage of a criminal cause and also compels
the defendant in the course of a criminal proceed-
ing to incriminate himself by his own utterances.
Police Officer Liable for Detention Under a
Void Ordinance---The plaintiff was an itinerent
vendor of tailored clothing. He was arrested by a
local police officer for violating a municipal or-
dinance which imposed an occupational tax on
such an endeavor. At the time of the arrest, the
police officer knew that the vendor claimed im-
munity from the ordinance by reason of the fact
that he was engaged in interstate commerce. Fur-
thermore, the officer knew that the vendor had
been arrested on this same charge previously and
that he had been released by the courts.
The vendor's action here was for false imprison-
ment, and the trial court dismissed his claim. On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that a cause of action was em-
bodied in plaintiff's contention that the officer had
detained the plaintiff under an ordinance which
the officer knew was invalid or inapplicable. (One
judge dissented.) Miller v. Slinetlt, 257 F.2d 910
(10th Cir. 1958).
In reaching its decision, the majority stated that
a detention made by a police officer in good faith
.reliance on an ordinance, valid on its face but invalid
or inapplicable in fact, may be privileged. How-
ever, this privilege does not extend to a detention
by an officer who knows or has reason to believe
that the ordinance is invalid or inapplicable. In
the instant case, this knowledge was furnished by
the prior arrest and release of the vendor on the
same charge.
The dissent could not accept this position. It
pointed out that, under the ordinance, the police
were required to arrest any violators of this law and
thus the defendant lacked any discretion to deter-
mine the applicability of the ordinance to the
vendor. Moreover, the dissent asked, how can any
ministerial officer have the duty to judge the con-
stitutionality of a statute or an ordinance? Public
policy does not demand this.
Garlic Odor Proper Identification-The de-
fendant was charged with an armed robbery com-
mitted by a masked bandit wearing a handkerchief
over his face and a large hat pulled down over his
eyes. Even though the victims could not see the
robber's face, they did notice a distinct odor of
garlic about the gunman.
The defendant was arrested by the police on the
basis of a general description and at his trial evi-
dence was introduced that he had eaten spaghetti
with garlic sauce just prior to the crime. The de-
fendant was convicted and he appealed. A superior
court of New Jersey held that the evidence show-
ing that the defendant had consumed garlic-
seasoned food was sufficient to identify the de-
fendant as the robber, when witnesses testified
that the crime had been committed by a bandit
who emanated a garlic odor. State v. Buffa, 143 A.2d
833 (1958).
The court in its opinion stated that this evi-
dence was not prejudicial, and in fact it had a sig-
nificant probative value to link the defendant with
the crime.
State Allows Use of Illegal Wire Tap Evidence-
The defendant was convicted of bookmaking and
pool selling in violation of a Pennsylvania statute.
The only evidence that was offered at his trial
was a transcript of certain telephone conversa-
tions which were intercepted by the local police
authorities through the means of a wire-tap. The
defendant appealed, challenging this evidence on
the grounds that the use of a wire tap has been
prohibited by a federal statute (47 U.S.C.A.
§ 605). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected
this appeal and held that wire-tap evidence secured
in violation of a federal statute was admissible in
the course of a criminal prosecution of a Pennsvl-
vania crime in a Pennsylvania court under the
Pennsylvania rules of evidence. State v. Foci.
143 A.2d 652 (1958).
Upon appeal, the defendant premised his argu-
ments on a federal statute which prohibits the
unauthorized interception and divulgence of tele-
phone conversations. The defendant maintained
that under this plainly worded statute it is illegal
and unconstitutional to use in any criminal
prosecution evidence obtained by wiretapping.
The court, however, upheld the defendant's con-
viction on the basis of its previous holding that
evidence secured by wiretapping is admissible
under the Pennsylvania rules of evidence which
are not governed by statute. Chaitt v. State, 380 Pa.
532, 112 A.2d 379 (1958). It believed that the doc-
trine of the Chaitl case was still binding precedent.
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